Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Statement: once a statement is made the utterer is committed to it. In contrast to this, a sentence can be thought of as a string of symbols that is no statement. See also Assertions, Sentences, Utterances, Judgments._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Alfred Jules Ayer on Statements - Dictionary of Arguments
I 281 Statement/world/Ayer: anything in the world must be distinguished from the statement. I 289 Statements/Ayer: 3 conditions: a) they must be checked directly b) be simply c) absolutely specific - then "fact" is definable: I 290 "Great statement"/Hegel/Ayer: (paraphrased): "the whole truth". AyerVsHegel/AyerVsIdealism/AyerVsBradley: then all normal statements are wrong. Wrong solution: "partially true." AyerVs: that makes all statements indistinguishable - (> indistinguishability). >Statements, >Perception, >World, >Judgments, >Facts, >Indistinguishability._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Ayer I Alfred J. Ayer "Truth" in: The Concept of a Person and other Essays, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ayer II Alfred Jules Ayer Language, Truth and Logic, London 1936 In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke, Ayer III Alfred Jules Ayer "The Criterion of Truth", Analysis 3 (1935), pp. 28-32 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 |